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REDISTRICTING PRINCIPLES FOR THE 
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 
Micah Altman†  
Michael P. McDonald†† 
ABSTRACT 
Baker v. Carr’s elevation of new population equality criteria for 
redistricting over old geographic-based criteria reflected an 
evolution in how the courts and society understood the principles 
of representation. Twenty-first century principles of redistricting 
should reflect modern understandings of representation and good 
government—and also reflect the new opportunities and 
constraints made possible through advancing technology and data 
collection.  
INTRODUCTION 
The landmark 1962 United States Supreme Court decision Baker 
v. Carr1 profoundly affected redistricting practices. Prior to the 
decision, the federal government imposed limited regulations on 
congressional districting that were weakly enforced. Congressional 
and state legislative redistricting rules and procedures were to be 
found primarily in state constitutions and statutes that were similarly 
rarely enforced. By declaring redistricting to be justiciable, the Court 
laid down a marker in Baker that federal constitutional and statutory 
criteria would be enforced upon the states. A flurry of redistricting 
activity commenced following subsequent decisions in Wesberry v. 
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 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
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Sanders2 and in Reynolds v. Sims3 finding that the Fourteenth 
Amendment requires districts to be of equal population. The federal 
courts overturned many state redistricting provisions in whole, 
particularly when sections that favored minimum allocation of seats 
to local government administrative units would result in 
impermissibly large population deviations among districts.  
At the time, observers cheered these decisions, believing that 
disarming the gerrymandering demon’s tool of malapportionment—
unequal district populations—would significantly constrain 
redistricting mischief. However, politicians reacted to the 
subordinance of traditional redistricting principles to population 
equality by using population equality as justification to draw non-
compact districts that split existing political boundaries. The intent 
behind these oddly shaped districts was often to favor or disfavor a 
political party, minority community, or incumbent by finely slicing 
communities, and even isolate prospective candidates’ homes, using 
district lines. The gerrymander evolved and continued to thrive in its 
new legal environment. 
In the decades following Baker, reformers have struggled to forge 
new links to chain the dreaded gerrymander—and have had some 
notable successes such as the federal Voting Rights Act and the 
adoption of citizen redistricting commissions by ballot initiative in 
states such as Arizona and California. This Article’s purpose is to 
categorize these efforts to regulate redistricting and to identify new 
opportunities made possible by emerging technological innovations. 
By doing so, we hope to illuminate potentially viable heretofore 
unexplored reform pathways enabled by technological innovations. 
I. REDISTRICTING PRINCIPLES PRIOR TO BAKER V. CARR 
Early U.S. districting was based on principles of representation 
found primarily in state constitutions that recognized both individual 
interests and territorially organized (although not necessarily 
contiguous) communities. The primary operational constraints were 
the regularity of redistricting to equalize populations, and the integrity 
of administrative units, most often counties. Contiguity was a 
common, but secondary constraint. Often, districting was 
synonymous with the practice of applying a population formula to 
allocate a number of legislative seats to administrative units such as 
counties or towns, a process known as apportionment.  
                                                                                                                 
2
 376 U.S. 1 (1964). 
3
 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
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The U.S. Constitution is silent on the use of districts as a means to 
select members to Congress, much less on the use and manner of 
redistricting. Article I, section 2 of the U.S. Constitution describes a 
method of apportionment of congressional seats to the states 
following the decennial census.4 And, until the 28th Congress, 20 to 
44 percent of representatives were not elected from single-member 
districts.5  
Using the authority granted under Article I, section 4, Congress 
mandated the use of single member districts in 1842.6 
Notwithstanding the prohibition on multi-member congressional 
districts, representatives continued to be elected from multi-
member/at-large districts in every subsequent decade before Baker. 
And, prior to the equal population standard articulated in the litigation 
subsequent to Baker, states would only be required to change their 
congressional districts in the event that apportionment resulted in a 
loss of a seat to Congress. Even then, political circumstances 
sometimes prevented a state from implementing a new districting 
                                                                                                                 
4
 Article I, section 2 states that “[t]he Number of Representatives shall not exceed one for 
every thirty Thousand, but each State shall have at Least one Representative.” U.S. Const. art. I, 
§ 2. This was later amended in section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment, which provides that 
“Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to their respective 
numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed.” Id. 
at amend. XIV, § 2. The number of seats gradually increased over time as the county’s 
population grew. In 1911, the number of representatives was set at 433, plus two more seats 
allocated for Arizona and New Mexico when they achieved statehood. Act of Aug. 3, 1911, ch. 
5, 37 Stat. 13, 14. Congress failed to enact an apportionment for the 1920 census, and in 1929, a 
compromise was reached that permanently fixed the number at 435. Reapportionment Act of 
June 18, 1929, ch. 28, 46 Stat. 21, 26, 27. Temporary increases were permitted in 1960 for 
Alaska and Hawaii statehood. Alaska Statehood Act, Pub. L. No. 85–508, § 9, 72 Stat. 339, 345 
(1958); Hawaii Statehood Act, Pub. L. No. 86–3, § 8, 73 Stat. 4, 8 (1959). 
5
 Micah Altman, Traditional Districting Principles: Judicial Myths vs. Reality, 22 SOC. 
SCI. HIST. 159, 171 tbl.5 (1998).  
6
 Act of June 25, 1842, ch. 47, § 2, 5 Stat. 491; see Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 8 
n.11 (1964) (“As late as 1842, seven States still conducted congressional elections at large.”). 
The requirement was omitted in 1850, Act of May 23, 1850, ch. 11, § 25, 9 Stat. 428, 432–33, 
but reinstated in 1862, Act of July 14, 1862, ch. 170, 12 Stat. 572. The requirement was omitted 
in the Reapportionment Act of June 18, 1929, ch. 28, § 22, 46 Stat. 21, 26–27; see also, Wood 
v. Broom, 287 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1932) (discussing the legislative history of the 1929 Act and 
determining that the omission was deliberate). Congress reinstated the requirement in 1967, Act 
of Dec. 14, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90–196, 81 Stat. 581 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 2c (2006)); see 
generally Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 555–56 (1946) (discussing the history of 
congressional redistricting legislation). Although it is contemplated in 2 U.S.C. § 2a(c) that at-
large elections may be used to elect members of Congress if a state fails to conduct a 
redistricting, 2 U.S.C. § 2c requires that “only” single-member districts shall be used, which was 
given precedence over 2 U.S.C. § 2a(c) in Branch v. Smith, 538 U.S. 254 (2003), except when 
“on the eve of a congressional election, no constitutional redistricting plan exists and there is no 
time for either the State’s legislature or the courts to develop one.” Id. at 275 (opinion of Scalia, 
J.). 
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plan, and attempts to enforce the law in the courts generally met with 
failure.7 
Through statute, the federal government prior to Baker also 
imposed some criteria on how the districts were to be drawn. The 
1872 Act required that congressional districts have “practicable” 
population equality, and the 1901 Act added a general compactness 
requirement.8 However, the 1929 apportionment compromise did not 
reinstate any of the past Acts’ requirements for contiguity, equal-
population, compactness, or single-member districts.9  
In the federal system, states are tasked with drawing districts. State 
constitutions often describe a mechanism for apportionment or 
redistricting their state legislatures, since that function is a part of 
organizing state government. However, with two exceptions—
California’s county integrity requirement and West Virginia’s 
requirement for contiguity and compactness10—prior to Baker they 
were silent on congressional redistricting, perhaps because the federal 
government had primary oversight of congressional elections through 
Article I, section 4 of the U.S. Constitution.11  
All states use a district-based system to elect state legislatures. 
Today, all states award a seat to the candidate that receives a plurality 
of the vote in an election.12 While most states use single-member 
districts, some elect multiple candidates from the same district, and 
some states have implemented what are known as floterial districts, 
where districts for the same legislative body may overlap.13 In states 
                                                                                                                 
7
 See, e.g., Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. at 552 (refusing to intervene in a redistricting 
controversy in Illinois “because due regard for the effective working of our Government 
revealed this issue to be of a peculiarly political nature and therefore not meet for judicial 
determination”). 
8
 See Altman, supra note 5, at 167 (summarizing chapter nine of LAURENCE F. 
SCHMECKEBIER, CONGRESSIONAL APPORTIONMENT 127–92 (1941)).  
9
 It was unclear whether these requirements were in effect until the Court ruled that the 
Acts applied only to the apportionment for which they were written. See Wood v. Broom, 287 
U.S. at 6 (interpreting the provisions of each reapportionment act to apply “to the election of 
representatives ‘under this apportionment,’ that is, the apportionment made by the particular 
act”). 
10
 Altman, supra note 5, at 168 tbl. 3. 
11
 For a review of the current laws see Michael P. McDonald, A Comparative Analysis of 
U.S. State Redistricting Institutions, 4 ST. POL. & POL’Y Q. 371 (2004); JUSTIN LEVITT, 
BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, A CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO REDISTRICTING (2010), available at 
http://www.brennancenter.org/content/resource/a_citizens_guide_to_redistricting_2010_edition. 
12
 See James L. McDowell, Illinois, in REAPPORTIONMENT POLITICS, THE HISTORY OF 
REDISTRICTING IN THE 50 STATES 101, 108 (Leroy Hardy et al. eds., 1981) (describing how 
Illinois was the last state to employ a form of proportional representation for the state House, a 
system that was replaced with plurality-win elections in 1980). 
13
 New Hampshire is the only state that currently uses floterial districts for state 
legislatures. See Boyer v. Gardner, 540 F. Supp. 624, 626 (D.N.H. 1982) (upholding the state’s 
use of floterial districts). Floterial districts were used for congressional elections when a state 
would gain a district through apportionment, fail to redistrict, and elect the addition seats 
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that use multi-member districts, voters are typically given a number 
of votes equal to the number of seats and may vote for one or more 
candidates. Candidates are rank-ordered by the votes they receive and 
the top candidates for a given number of seats to be elected are 
declared winners. All states must redistrict their legislative districts, 
with the exception that no redistricting is required if a state is 
allocated a single congressional district. 
The state constitutional and statutory mechanisms by which 
redistricting for both congressional and state legislative redistricting 
occurs are varied as to the process, timing of redistricting, and criteria 
to be applied.14 And unlike the federal courts, prior to Baker v. Carr, 
state courts occasionally weighed-in on state constitutional issues. For 
example, state courts adjudicated alleged state constitutional 
violations in California, Illinois, Michigan, New York, North 
Carolina, and Wisconsin.15 But, even for states with state 
constitutional provisions guiding state legislative redistricting, 
deference by the state courts to the political process was historically 
the norm.  
Altman lists the formal criteria for legislative redistricting in each 
state and the time of their adoption.16 To summarize, states were split 
on the primary method of apportionment—while some states based 
apportionment of state legislatures’ seats on population, others 
explicitly apportioned by counties, cities or other pre-existing 
geographical and political units. Even in states where apportionment 
was based on population, many states required that districts respect 
county lines. A substantial minority of states also required contiguity, 
and only seven required compactness. 
An empirical analysis of historical congressional districts reveals a 
somewhat different picture:17 Even in the absence of formal 
requirements, the vast majority of congressional districts followed 
county (or, more rarely, town and city) boundaries, at least up to the 
time of the 48th Congress in 1883.18 With the exception of districts 
                                                                                                                 
 
through overlapping at-large districts. 2 U.S.C. § 2a (2006). 
14
 For a survey of timing derived from state constitutions, state statutes, and state court 
opinions, see Justin Levitt & Michael P. McDonald, Taking the “Re” out of Redistricting: State 
Constitutional Provisions on Redistricting Timing, 95 GEO. L.J. 1247, 1254–66 (2007).  
15
 Levitt & McDonald, supra note 14, at 1255. 
16
 Altman, supra note 5, at 169–70. 
17
 See id. at 180–85 (finding that historically “very few districts divided town and county 
boundaries”); see also KENNETH C. MARTIS, THE HISTORICAL ATLAS OF UNITED STATES 
CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS, 1789–1983 (1982) (showing historical rural congressional districts 
tended to be composed of whole counties). 
18
 Altman, supra note 5, at 181 tbl. 7. 
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spanning large bodies of water, violations of contiguity were quite 
rare during this time.19 Historical congressional districts were also 
compact (by common quantitative measures) compared to modern, 
post-Baker districts.20  
Congressional districts were also routinely malapportioned, even 
after the passage of the 1842 Reapportionment Act. In the most 
malapportioned states, population varied by a ratio of 9.5 to 1 prior to 
the Act (during the 18th Congress), although the average degree of 
malapportionment was substantially lower.21  
In large part, both the relative compactness of the districts and 
their relative malapportionment were a result of the formal and 
informal emphasis on counties as a unit of representation. Counties 
were often themselves relatively compact, but varied greatly in 
population. The widespread practice of forming districts from 
contiguous counties limited the potential for districts to be non-
compact, while constraining the possibility for population equality.  
The stability of district boundaries also contributed to 
malapportionment. In practice, a state was forced to change its district 
lines only when a state’s seat allocation changed. And, even in this 
case, the required changes were more limited than after Baker: the 
addition of a seat might be addressed by adding an at-large district, 
while the subtraction of a seat could be addressed only by modifying 
a few districts.  
II. THE REAPPORTIONMENT REVOLUTION 
Baker was not the first acknowledgement by the Court that the 
right to vote went beyond the simple right to cast a ballot and to have 
that ballot counted. Two years earlier, in Gomillion v. Lightfoot,22 the 
Court recognized the principle that voters could be harmed by 
reducing the effectiveness of their vote. In Gomillion, Black 
petitioners asserted that the city of Tuskegee had gerrymandered its 
boundaries to remove all black resident voters, thereby eliminating 
any meaningful black participation in city elections. The Court 
agreed.  
Justice Frankfurter, delivering the opinion of the Court, framed the 
issue as a deprivation of the right of blacks to vote, as guaranteed by 
the Fifteenth Amendment.23 But the facts of the case were that no 
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 Id. at 180–81. 
20
 Id. at 181–85. 
21
 Id. at 177 fig. 5.  
22
 364 U.S. 339 (1960). 
23
 Id. at 340–48. 
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petitioner was individually denied the right to vote, nor were such 
votes literally discarded. Instead the voting power of blacks was 
effectively reduced by removing them from an important political 
unit. Gomillion’s operating principle seems to have been not an 
abstract racial classification but the denial of the effective right to 
vote.  
Following Baker, the Supreme Court’s two landmark 1964 
decisions Reynolds v. Sims24 and Wesberry v. Sanders25 imposed 
federal operational constraints of equal population and emphasized 
principles of equal protection. At the time, observers cheered these 
decisions. They believed that disarming the gerrymandering demon’s 
tool of malapportionment—unequal district populations—would 
significantly constrain redistricting mischief.26 To be sure, 
malapportionment had been a powerful tool to favor rural political 
interests by diminishing the effective voting power of urban dwellers 
living in fast growing cities.27 As Gelman and King note, however, 
“population equality guarantees almost no form of fairness beyond 
numerical equality of population.”28 Indeed, politicians reacted to the 
subordinance of traditional redistricting principles to population 
equality by using population equality as justification to draw non-
compact districts that split existing political boundaries.29 A 
motivation underlying these oddly shaped districts was often to favor 
or disfavor a political party, minority community, or incumbent by 
finely slicing communities, and even prospective candidates’ homes, 
with district lines. The partisan gerrymander evolved and continued to 
thrive in its new legal environment. 
A flurry of litigation in the wake of these 1964 decisions struck 
down many state constitutional practices, particularly apportionment 
procedures that allocated seats to counties or towns. Simple allocation 
rules guaranteeing a minimum number of seats to governmental units 
                                                                                                                 
24
 337 U.S. 533 (1964). 
25
 376 U.S. 1 (1964). 
26
 See John P. White & Norman C. Thomas, Urban and Rural Representation and State 
Legislative Apportionment, 17 W. POL. Q. 724, 741 (1964) (“Feelings of apathy and 
hopelessness about [malapportionment] have given way to a rather manic euphoria since the 
Baker and Reynolds decisions.”). 
27
 See, e.g., Stephen Ansolabehere, Alan Gerber & James Snyder, Equal Votes, Equal 
Money: Court-Ordered Redistricting and Public Expenditures in the American States, 96 AM. 
POL. SCI. REV. 767, 768 (2002) (finding the reapportionment revolution shifted allocation of 
federal money from rural areas to urban areas). 
28
 Andrew Gelman & Gary King, Enhancing Democracy through Legislative 
Redistricting, 88 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 541, 553 (1994). 
29
 See Richard G. Niemi & Laura R. Winsky, The Persistence of Partisan Redistricting 
Effects in Congressional Elections in the 1970s and 1980s, 54 J. POL. 565, 566 (1992) (“[T]here 
has been speculation that partisan gerrymandering only began to flower in the 1980s, as 
legislators learned how to take maximum advantage of the equal population requirement .”). 
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would result in impermissibly large population deviations among 
districts according to the Court’s new interpretation of the federal 
constitution. States revised their constitutions, often through state 
constitutional conventions. 
Empirically, a clear result of Baker was to reduce 
malapportionment at the cost of the main traditional redistricting 
criterion pre-Baker, county integrity. After the equal population 
criterion was introduced, the number of districts following county 
boundaries dropped dramatically, as did average geographic 
compactness of districts. Simultaneously, the number of districts that 
were not contiguous or that maintained contiguity through 
questionable measures, such as connection at a single point, increased 
dramatically. Similar changes occurred after Karcher v. Daggett,30 
which imposed near-absolute population equality requirements.31 
In some cases, states created redistricting commissions, either as a 
sole redistricting authority or as a backup to the regular legislative 
process.32 Some commentators believe that all redistricting 
commissions are “independent” from politics,33 and some redistricting 
commissions in other countries are relatively independent.34 A more 
pragmatic examination of redistricting commissions in the United 
States, however, and particularly these early ones, reveals that these 
commissions were more often designed to concentrate political power 
in party leaders, rather than to remove politics from the process. 
Among the most telling examples are those in which elected officials 
serve as commissioners.35 After Baker, the federal courts served as a 
                                                                                                                 
30
 462 U.S. 725 (1983). 
31
 See Altman, supra note 5, at 180–86 (attributing a decrease in compactness of districts 
after Karcher v. Daggett to the necessity of meeting the strict requirements, “which is not to say 
that some gerrymanderers did not make a virtue of necessity”).  
32
 See Levitt & McDonald, supra note 14, at 1255 n.36 (listing states that revisited district 
population requirements); McDonald, supra note 11, at 381 tbl.2 (listing states that amended 
their redistricting processes in the 1960s through the early 1970s: Colorado, Hawaii, Illinois, 
Indiana, Iowa, Maine, Mississippi, Missouri (state House only), Montana, New Jersey, 
Oklahoma, and Pennsylvania). Some states enacted reforms preceding the 1960s. Ohio 
instituted the first U.S. redistricting commission as sole redistricting authority in 1851 and 
Texas pioneered the commission as a backup to a failure of the legislative process in 1948. Id. 
These states share a common principle with the states that later amended their constitutions: 
Ohio and Texas sought to ensure that districts were regularly drawn in a timely manner in order 
to manage their states’ population growth. Kathleen L. Barber, Ohio, in REAPPORTIONMENT 
POLITICS, supra note 12, at 256–57; Ronald G. Claunch, Wesley S. Chumlea & James G. 
Dickson, Jr., Texas, in REAPPORTIONMENT POLITICS, supra note 12, at 311.  
33
 Alan Abramowitz, Brad Alexander, & Matthew Gunning, Don’t Blame Redistricting 
for Uncompetitive Elections, 39 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 87, 87–89 (2006). 
34
 See Micah Altman & Michael P. McDonald, Technology for Public Participation in 
Redistricting, in REDISTRICTING AND REAPPORTIONMENT IN THE WEST 247–71 (Gary F. 
Moncrief ed. 2011) (discussing a project to enable the public instead of politicians to draw 
redistricting plans). 
35
 See McDonald, supra note 11, at 380–84 (describing the functioning of redistricting 
2012] REDISTRICTING PRINCIPLES 1187 
reversionary point if a state failed to redistrict, whereas, prior to 
Baker, the previous plan would have remained in force unless a state 
experienced a change in the number of congressional districts through 
apportionment.36 Thus, a goal of these commissions was to ensure 
that redistricting plans were implemented without engaging the 
courts, which might adopt plans (or create their own) in opposition to 
political leaders’ interests. 
A second wave of redistricting reform began in the 1980s, more 
typically through the initiative process.37 A hallmark of these recent 
reforms is that they are championed by good government groups and 
are intended to reduce the influence of politics in the redistricting 
process.38 These commissions are modeled on bureaucratic 
redistricting institutions used in other countries in that ostensibly 
politically independent commissioners are tasked to draw lines 
following a set of traditional redistricting criteria.39  
Some posit that traditional redistricting principles can act as a 
hedge against gerrymandering.40 One should be cautious, however, 
about putting one’s faith in traditional redistricting principles to 
produce politically neutral outcomes. Chief Justice Brennan 
pessimistically noted that following traditional criteria, such as 
drawing pleasing shapes, is a not a gerrymandering cure, stating that, 
“this politically mindless approach may produce, whether intended or 
not, the most grossly gerrymandered results . . . .”41 And, as the next 
                                                                                                                 
 
commissions in various states). 
36
 See GARY W. COX & JONATHAN N. KATZ, ELBRIDGE GERRY’S SALAMANDER: THE 
ELECTORAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE REAPPORTIONMENT REVOLUTION 61 (2002) (finding that 
the equal population mandate erased a 6 percentage point Republican bias outside the South and 
increased the incumbency advantage). 
37
 States that more recently reformed their redistricting processes through citizen-led 
ballot initiatives include Arizona, California, Florida, and Washington. Alaska and Idaho’s 
legislatures amended their constitutions through legislative-proposed referendum during this 
period, but these reforms were designed primarily to reduce the influence of the governor in 
redistricting. See discussion infra Part III.  
38
 For an alternative view on redistricting reform, see Daniel H. Lowenstein & Jonathan 
Steinberg, The Quest for Legislative Districting in the Public Interest: Elusive or Illusory?, 33 
UCLA L. REV. 1, 4 (1985) (arguing that legislatures can be held accountable through elections 
while independent commissions are unelected and cannot be punished, that legislators know the 
communities in their districts the best, and that legislators are the best suited to deliberate the 
thorny trade-offs that are inherent in redistricting). 
39
 For a survey of these commissions, see Lisa Handley, A Comparative Survey of 
Structures and Criteria for Boundary Delimitation, in REDISTRICTING IN COMPARATIVE 
PERSPECTIVE 265 (Lisa Handley & Bernie Grofman eds., 2008).  
40
 See JONATHAN WINBURN, THE REALITIES OF REDISTRICTING: FOLLOWING THE RULES 
AND LIMITING GERRYMANDERING IN STATE LEGISLATIVE REDISTRICTING 9 (2008) 
(“Specifically, the principle against splitting political subdivisions plays a key function in 
constraining the remappers from gerrymandering.”). 
41
 Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 753 (1973); see also, FRANK R. PARKER, BLACK 
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section describes, facially neutral criteria such as geographic 
compactness are likely to systematically favor one party. 
Indeed, more recent reforms also adopt “shall not favor” language 
indicating that a redistricting plan should not overtly benefit a party or 
candidate or go even further to require political outcomes, such as 
competitive districts.42 As federal courts have established (mostly) 
consistent federal standards for redistricting, the political legal battles 
over redistricting have shifted to the state courts and allegations of 
violations of state criteria,43 raising in importance an understanding of 
how these criteria are implemented. 
III. A TYPOLOGY OF REDISTRICTING REGULATIONS 
The history of redistricting inscribes a circular route from an 
emphasis on traditional redistricting principles; to, in the wake of 
Baker, an emphasis on population equality and minority voting rights 
at the expense of traditional redistricting principles; and returning to 
focus on traditional principles, with recent efforts by reformers to re-
elevate respect for traditional redistricting principles. Coupled with 
the renewed emphasis on traditional redistricting principles is a 
recognition that they do not, alone, suffice to curtail gerrymandering, 
that political outcomes should be explicitly incorporated into 
redistricting criteria, and that these criteria must be considered by an 
independent redistricting body.44  
Adam Cox devises a useful typology to describe three elements of 
redistricting regulation: process-based regulations, which are 
designed to constrain how the lines are drawn; outcome-based 
regulations, which are designed to prospectively produce a political 
outcome; and institution-selecting regulations, which are designed to 
alter who draws the lines.45 
                                                                                                                 
 
VOTES COUNT: POLITICAL EMPOWERMENT IN MISSISSIPPI AFTER 1965 153–56 (1990) 
(describing how an ostensibly neutral criterion was used to disguise a racial gerrymander in 
Hinds County, Mississippi); MICHAEL P. MCDONALD, THE MIDWEST MAPPING PROJECT 
(2009), available at http://elections.gmu.edu/Midwest_Mapping_Project.pdf (describing how 
traditional redistricting principles tend to result in pro-Democratic biases in five Midwestern 
states).  
42
 Bruce E. Cain, Karin Mac Donald, & Michael McDonald, From Equality to Fairness: 
The Path of Political Reform Since Baker v. Carr, in PARTY LINES: COMPETITION, 
PARTISANSHIP AND CONGRESSIONAL REDISTRICTING 6, 26–27 (Thomas E. Mann & Bruce E. 
Cain eds., 2005). 
43
 Id. at 17.  
44
 Id. at 6–28. 
45
 See Adam Cox, Partisan Fairness and Redistricting Politics, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 751, 
756 (2004) (describing those three elements of redistricting regulation); see also Michael P. 
McDonald, Regulating Redistricting, 40 PS: POL. SCI. AND POL. 675, 675 (2007) (same). 
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Process-based regulations describe formalistic criteria that are 
applied to the drawing of districts; many of these are commonly 
known as ‘traditional’ redistricting principles. While we discuss 
specific examples, for the sake of space, we refer interested readers to 
complete lists of state criteria compiled by others.46 These criteria 
include population equality, contiguity, compactness, respect for 
existing political boundaries, respect for communities of interest, 
preservation of district cores, and nesting of districts.47 Process-based 
regulations constrain the choices available to a redistricting authority 
and are claimed to foster better constituent-representative linkages by 
aligning community and district boundaries.48 
During the 1960s, federal courts applied a population equality 
standard for congressional districts in Wesberry v. Sanders and for 
state legislative districts in Reynolds v. Sims. For congressional 
redistricting, the federal courts (following Karcher v. Daggett) have 
generally adopted a de minimis standard requiring exact population 
equality, although they will allow deviations to achieve a compelling 
state interest.49 The federal courts have allowed up to a 10 percentage-
point range for state legislative districts.50 The federally allowable 
range is a floor, and some states have enacted more restrictive 
population deviations for their state legislative districts. 
Contiguity simply means that all parts of a district must connect. 
While generally non-controversial, example districts of questionable 
contiguity stretch across water, intersect another district over water or 
at a single point, are comprised of continuous land but are not 
navigable using existing transportation routes, or are connected only 
                                                                                                                 
46




 See Richard N. Engstrom, District Geography and Voters, in REDISTRICTING IN THE 
NEW MILLENNIUM 65, 74–77 (Peter F. Galderisi ed., 2005) (discussing and testing the 
hypothesis that alignment of community and district boundaries leads to higher voter turnout); 
Richard G. Niemi, Lynda W. Powell, & Patricia L. Bicknell, The Effects of Congruity Between 
Community and District on Salience of U.S. House Candidates, 11 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 187, 188–90 
(1986) (exploring the relationship between community-district congruity and citizens’ 
knowledge of congressional candidates, and finding that “the nature of the district is related to 
candidate awareness.”). 
49
 See Karcher v Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 782 (1983) (articulating a de minimis population 
standard for congressional districts unless there is a compelling state interest). Arkansas, Iowa, 
and West Virginia drew districts out of whole counties in the 2000s. The constitutionality of 
these plans, however, was never tested in federal court. See MARTIS, supra note 17 (showing 
how prior to Baker v. Carr rural congressional districts were often drawn out of whole 
counties).  
50
 See Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835, 842 (1983) (“Our decisions have established, as 
a general matter, that an apportionment plan with a maximum population deviation under 10% 
falls within this category of minor deviations.”). But see Cox v. Larios, 542 U.S. 947, 949 
(2004) (finding a state cannot systematically under-populate a party’s districts within the ten 
percentage point range). 
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at a single point.51 Compactness refers to the shape of a district, but is 
formally ill-defined. Scholars have proposed over fifty compactness 
measures, which have not resulted in clarity, since these measures 
conflict and can be manipulated.52 Iowa is the only state that has 
adopted by statute an unambiguously defined quantitatively 
measurable compactness measure.53 Otherwise, the federal and state 
courts have generally found constitutionally impermissible 
compactness violations based on visual inspection of the shape of a 
district.54 
Redistricting authorities may be required to respect political, 
physical, and cultural boundaries. Some states require that district 
boundaries respect existing political boundaries, which may include 
counties, municipalities, cities, towns, villages, and even local 
precincts and wards. States may require districts to follow visible 
geographic features, such as rivers, mountains, or islands. States may 
require respect for communities of interest, which may include local 
government units, but may also include any identifiable geographic 
community that shares common social interests, economic interests, 
media markets, transportation corridors, or demographic factors.55 
These communities may straddle or be contained within local 
government units.56 Even other legislative district boundaries may be 
respected, a practice known as nesting, which is particularly relevant 
when two or more lower chamber districts are wholly contained 
within a Senate district.57 
Outcome-based regulations seek to achieve political goals. Among 
the most well-known political goals is the goal of minority 
representation that is enshrined in the federal Voting Rights Act and 
similar language found in some state constitutions. Volumes have 
been written and litigated concerning the Voting Rights Act, so we 
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 See Altman, supra note 5, at 164 (“[B]reaches of contiguity may be difficult or 
impossible to avoid because of geographic obstacles, such as large bodies of water . . . .”). 
52
 See Richard G. Niemi, Bernard Grofman, Carl Carlucci & Thomas Hoffeller, 
Measuring Compactness and the Role of a Compactness Standard in a Test for Partisan and 
Racial Gerrymandering, 52 J. POL. 1155, 1156 (1990) (discussing the advantages and 
disadvantages of several compactness measures); Altman supra note 5, at 165–66 (same). 
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 IOWA CODE, Title II § 42.4. 
54
 See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 655–56 (1993) (finding North Carolina’s 12th 
Congressional District adopted in the 1990s was “bizarre” in shape, and thus subordinated 
traditional redistricting principles to racial motivations). 
55
 See Levitt, supra note 11, at 56 for a detailed description of these considerations with 
examples. 
56
 For example, see COLO. CONST. art. V, § 47(3) stating “communities of interest, 
including ethnic, cultural, economic, trade area, geographic, and demographic factors, shall be 
preserved within a single district wherever possible.” 
57
 Levitt, supra note 11, at 66. 
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will only briefly describe it here.58 Section 2 and section 5 of the 
Voting Rights Act may be considered outcome-based regulations. 
Section 2 applies nationally and the U.S. Supreme Court has 
articulated a three-prong test requiring minority opportunity districts 
to be drawn if a district can be drawn in a compact manner, there is 
racially polarized voting, and there is a past history of 
discrimination.59 Section 5 applies to certain “covered” jurisdictions 
primarily in the South and requires that the Department of Justice or 
the District Court of D.C. determine if an adopted redistricting plan 
reduces minority representation from the previous plan.60 If it does, 
the plan cannot take effect.  
The U.S. Supreme Court has found that partisan gerrymandering is 
justiciable;61 however, the Court has never overturned a redistricting 
plan because it was an impermissible partisan gerrymander. The 
Justices are currently divided 4-1-4, with four believing that partisan 
gerrymandering is a political question that cannot be adjudicated, four 
believing there is a standard that can be applied to detect a partisan 
gerrymander, and Justice Kennedy, who believes that partisan 
gerrymandering is justiciable, but had not identified a standard to his 
liking.62  
Where the federal government has declined to take action to 
prevent partisan gerrymandering, some states have stepped into the 
void. Donald Stokes, an appointed tie-breaking member of New 
Jersey’s state legislative redistricting commission, adopted a widely 
used political science method to measure the partisan bias of a 
redistricting plan and invited the political parties to bid for his vote by 
crafting a plan with the least degree of bias.63 Recently, the Florida 
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 See generally VOTING RIGHTS ACT REAUTHORIZATION OF 2006: PERSPECTIVES ON 
DEMOCRACY, PARTICIPATION, AND POWER (Ana Henderson ed., 2007) (collecting various 
studies on the Voting Rights Act); DAVID CANON, RACE, REDISTRICTING, AND 
REPRESENTATION: THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF BLACK MAJORITY DISTRICTS 60–92 
(1999) (discussing consequences of the VRA for black majority districts); DAVID LUBLIN, THE 
PARADOX OF REPRESENTATION: RACIAL GERRYMANDERING AND MINORITY INTERESTS IN 
CONGRESS 4–12 (1997) (providing an overview of the VRA and its impact on racial 
redistricting); QUIET REVOLUTION IN THE SOUTH: THE IMPACT OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT, 
1965–1990 (Chandler Davidson & Bernard Grofman eds., 1994) (providing a thorough 
overview of the VRA and its impact in the South). 
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 Voting Rights Act, Pub. L. No. 89–110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 1973–1973bb–1 (2006)); see Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 89–90 (1986) (articulating 
the three-prong test); Bartlett v. Strickland, 129 S.Ct. 1231, 1246 (2009) (requiring the 
demonstration district contain at least 50 percent voting-age population of the minority group).  
60
 Voting Rights Act § 5, 79 Stat. at 439.  
61
 See Davis v Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 113 (1986) (“[W]e find such political 
gerrymandering to be justiciable . . . .”). 
62
 See League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 418–20 (2006) 
(opinion of Kennedy, J.) (examining various standards but not approving of any one). 
63
 See DONALD E. STOKES, LEGISLATIVE REDISTRICTING BY THE NEW JERSEY PLAN 
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Supreme Court held that some state Senate districts violated a 
criterion adopted by a voter initiative in 2010 that states, “No 
apportionment plan or district shall be drawn with the intent to favor 
or disfavor a political party or an incumbent.”64 
Related to partisan gerrymandering is a concern that redistricting 
authorities—particularly incumbents—seek to diminish electoral 
competition by drawing safe districts.65 To address this concern, 
Arizona, Washington, and Wisconsin (since repealed) have required 
competitive districts to be drawn with a balance of Democrats and 
Republicans.66 
Institution-selecting regulations have most commonly taken the 
form of a redistricting commission that removes authority from 
legislatures. More generally, institution-selecting regulations place 
constraints on who creates and selects plans, what influences they are 
subject to, and under what conditions they may act.  
The history of gerrymandering is replete with examples of 
legislators using the process to further their ambitions.67 As the 
reform saw goes, in redistricting legislators choose voters rather than 
voters choose legislators. Redistricting authorities can use political 
information to affect electoral outcomes, such as the location of 
incumbent and challenger homes and the partisan composition of 
neighborhoods, to attempt to influence political outcomes. Some 
                                                                                                                 
 
(1993); see also Bernard Grofman & Gary King, The Future of Partisan Symmetry as a Judicial 
Test for Partisan Gerrymandering after LULAC v. Perry, 6 ELECTION L. J. 2, 10 (2007) 
(discussing statistical approaches to measure degree of partisan bias); J. Morgan Kousser, 
Estimating the Partisan Consequences of Redistricting Plans-Simply, 21 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 521, 
521 (1996) (predicting partisan consequences of redistricting plans).  
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 FLA. CONST., art. III, § 21(a); see also In re Senate Joint Resolution of Legislative 
Apportionment 1176, No. SC12–1 (Fla. 2012), available at 
http://www.floridasupremecourt.org/sc12-1.pdf (interpreting the standards set forth in the 
Florida constitutional amendment); HAW. CONST. art. IV, § 6 (the first state to adopt the 
language “No district shall be so drawn as to unduly favor a person or faction.”). 
65
 See Michael P. McDonald, Redistricting and Competitive Districts, in THE 
MARKETPLACE OF DEMOCRACY, ELECTORAL COMPETITION AND AMERICAN POLITICS 222, 227, 
229 (Michael P. McDonald & John Samples eds., 2006) (discussing incumbent protection 
gerrymanders). For a contrary opinion, see THOMAS L. BRUNELL REDISTRICTING AND 
REPRESENTATION: WHY COMPETITIVE ELECTIONS ARE BAD FOR AMERICA 75–89 (2008) 
(arguing that uncompetitive districts are desired to minimize the number of people who vote for 
the losing candidate). 
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 For examples of the requirements, see WASH. REV. CODE § 44.05.090 (2011) and ARIZ. 
CONST. art. IV, part 2, § 1; WIS. STAT. § 4.001(3) (1981) (repealed 1983). 
67
 Paul J. Webber, Madison’s Opposition to a Second Convention, 20 POLITY 498, 489–
517 (1988) (describing how Patrick Henry attempted to draw his political foe—James Madison 
—out of his district); see, e.g., John Mercurio, Between the Lines, ROLL CALL, July 2, 2001 
(describing how candidate Marty Castro was drawn out of Rep. Luis Gutierrez’s district in 
Illinois). The very name “gerrymander” comes from a Massachusetts state legislative district 
proposed by Gov. Elbridge Gerry in 1812, drawn in the shape of a salamander with the intent of 
favoring the Federalist Party. COX & KATZ, supra note 36, at 3.  
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states, such as Iowa, blind those drawing the lines from this political 
information, with the hope that a blind process produces a neutral 
result.68 As stated above, Chief Justice Brennan and others might 
disagree that a blind person casting a dart is capable of reliably hitting 
a bulls-eye without assistance. 
As described above, many of the early commissions were not 
designed to be politically neutral: elected officials or their lieutenants 
served on them with the purpose to concentrate political power in 
party leaders. More recent commissions are designed to reduce 
political influence in redistricting through regulating the selection and 
activities of commissioners. The 1960 Alaska constitution was first to 
limit who could be selected to a redistricting commission, requiring 
that “none . . . may be public employees or officials.”69 Hawaii and 
Missouri forbid their commissioners from running for office in the 
districts they draw.70 Arizona and California impose both regulations, 
and further require an agency to vet prospective commissioners to 
weed out any partisan wolves in sheep’s clothing.71 Similar 
constraints may be implemented through norms. The New Jersey 
Supreme Court—responsible for selecting the tie-breaking member of 
the state’s commissions—has traditionally selected a neutral tie-
breaking member and the Iowa advisory commission’s reputation for 
neutrality flows from the professionalism exhibited by the legislative 
support staff tasked with drawing plans.72 
IV. THE PROMISE OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 
No redistricting plan can satisfy everyone, barring the ‘utopia’ 
Madison describes in Federalist 10 in which, “every citizen [had] the 
same opinions, the same passions, and the same interests.”73 In such a 
situation, redistricting would have no effect on representation—as all 
districts lines would result in the same representational outcome. 
Redistricting is thus inherently about balancing competing 
representational goals, while conforming to existing geography and 
demography. For example, political units may have oddly shaped or 
even non-contiguous geography, which can result in non-compact or 
even non-contiguous districts.74 A distinctive characteristic of 
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 IOWA CODE § 42.4(5) (2011). 
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 ALASKA CONST. art. VI, § 6. 
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 HAW. CONST. art. IV, § 2; MO. CONST. art. III, § 7.  
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 ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, Part 2, § 1(3); CAL. GOV’T CODE § 8251 (West 2005 &. Supp. 
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 STOKES, supra note 63.  
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 THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, (James Madison). 
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 See McDonald, supra note 41, at 155 (describing how Wisconsin’s 61st Senate district 
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redistricting, then, is that these goals are balanced, and constraints 
satisfied, through the application of expert judgment.  
In the twentieth century, process-based, outcome-based, and 
institution-selecting regulation failed to tame the gerrymander in the 
United States. The twenty-first century has brought a number of 
technological innovations and consequent changes in our 
understanding of redistricting regulation. We posit that redistricting in 
the twenty-first century can use information technology to improve 
governance.  
While we are optimistic about the ability for technology to reveal 
new process measures and re-imagine old ones, we are cautious about 
the ability for computers to ‘solve’ the gerrymandering problem. As 
early as the 1960s, scholars posited that computers could be 
programmed to automatically draw districts that best achieved a set of 
criteria in an ostensibly politically neutral manner.75 While we are 
enthusiastic proponents of a positive role for technology in 
redistricting, we are skeptical about the ability for computers to be 
programmed to provide a solution to gerrymandering.76 In addition to 
the potential for political bias to be hidden within the criteria chosen 
to be implemented, the optimization problem is too difficult for all 
but the simplest redistricting problems.77 
A. Information Technology & Process-Based Regulation of 
Redistricting 
While we believe that process-based regulations have diminished 
in importance, many reformers, scholars, and courts still highly value 
them. In a given context, such as to promote policy congruence 
between local government officials and state representatives, they 
may be highly relevant. 
The opportunities for use of, and our understandings of, pure 
process-based regulation of redistricting are changing. On the one 
                                                                                                                 
 
in the 2000s was non-contiguous because it followed a Racine ward that itself was non-
contiguous. The state addressed this situation by simply defining wards as contiguous in WIS. 
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 See William Vickrey, On The Prevention of Gerrymandering, 76 POL. SCI. Q. 105, 106 
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 Micah Altman & Michael P. McDonald, The Promise and Perils of Computers in 
Redistricting, 5 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 69 (2010).  
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 Micah Altman & Michael P. McDonald, BARD: Better Automated Redistricting, 42 J. 
STATISTICAL SOFTWARE 1, 28 (2011), available at http://www.jstatsoft.org/v42/i04. 
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hand, the formal importance of geographic criteria, such as 
compactness and conformance to political boundaries has diminished. 
As we discussed above, the emphasis on equal-population ushered in 
by Baker, in effect, forced other criteria to play, at best, a secondary 
role.  
As important, formal geographical criteria have been justified, in 
large part, because they are claimed to act as a proxy for 
transportation costs, communication costs, and campaign costs. 
Advances in communication technology have greatly weakened the 
connection between geographic distance and communication costs. 
And these advances, along with the widespread availability of 
detailed “micro-targeting” databases of information on voters—have 
enabled campaigns to much more effectively and economically target 
persuadable voters within districts rather than relying on district-wide 
campaign communication.78   
Another reason that traditional process measures have been used in 
practice, is that they were relatively easy to compute. As we describe 
in the next section, technological advances have made the 
computation of most imaginable outcome measures straightforward. 
This, too, diminishes the need for traditional process measure that are 
designed to serve as a proxy for outcome measures, such as limiting 
gerrymandering. Furthermore, computation-intensive analysis of 
process measures, enabled by computing advances, has identified 
potential biases—such as the tendency of compactness criteria to 
advantage the Republican party, because its support tends to be more 
evenly distributed geographically.79    
We hypothesize that information technology can enable new forms 
of geographical process measures that are based on crowd-sourced 
data. These measures are still in their infancy, but two emerging 
research directions are especially notable. The first direction is 
exemplified by the efforts of information scientists and geographers 
to analyze massive amounts of opportunistically collected individual 
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 D. SUNSHINE HILLYGUS & TODD G. SHIELDS, THE PERSUADABLE VOTER: WEDGE 
ISSUES IN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS (2009).  
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 See Micah Altman, Modeling the Effect of Mandatory District Compactness on 
Partisan Gerrymander, 17 POL. GEOGRAPHY 989, 989 (1998) (analyzing geographic 
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data, such as the temporal activity patterns from mobile-phone 
location traces, to identify travel patterns, land usage patterns and 
neighborhoods.80 Rather than “identifying” neighborhoods using 
demographic data, which requires making assumptions about what 
demographic characteristics are most relevant to community, this 
innovative line of research infers the presence of neighborhoods and 
communities from common patterns of activity and/or shared 
activities.   
The second direction is to enable individuals to identify their own 
communities using participative GIS on the web. This is an approach 
we have taken in building the DistrictBuilder software.81 The 
community mapping functionality, added in the last released version 
of DistrictBuilder, is, to our knowledge, entirely unique. An important 
aspect of drawing a redistricting plan is identification and 
consideration of communities of interest—but this has, until now, 
occurred in an ad-hoc way. The software extensions enable users to 
draw their own communities, independent of any particular 
redistricting plan; and to display and evaluate districting plans using 
their own community maps and community maps published by other 
users. Potentially, this can allow community boundaries to emerge 
organically from user input.   
B. Information Technology & Outcome-Based Regulation of 
Redistricting 
Advances in computing technology and statistical methodology 
have enabled relatively robust predictions across a wide range of 
types of electoral outcomes likely to result from any proposed 
redistricting plan.82 Among the many methodologies in use as 
outcome measures, Andrew Gelman’s and Gary King’s bias and 
responsiveness predictions have received the most recent scholarly 
recognition.83 It is easy, however, to conflate the prediction of 
electoral characteristics of plans with the detection of gerrymanders 
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 See, e.g., Giusy Di Lorenzo & Francesco Calabrese, Identifying Human Spatio-
Temporal Activity Patterns from Mobile-Phone Traces 1069–1074 (paper presented at 14th Int’l 
IEEE Conf. on Intelligent Transportation Systems, Oct. 5–7, 2011), available at 
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Redistricting Plans, 38 AM. J. POL. SCI. 513 (1994)  
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based on such predictions. The former has become fairly easy, 
whereas the latter remains deeply challenged.84   
One fundamental statistical limitation of such forecasting methods, 
as Gelman and King explain, is that they are predictive, not causal 
models, and are inferentially unrelated to gerrymandering. For 
example, as we have alluded to previously, a compactness standard 
generally favors the Republican Party. If a state has a compactness 
criterion in its state constitution, a naive interpretation of estimate 
predicting a Republican ‘bias’, may suggest that a Republican 
gerrymander occurred when in fact a redistricting authority was 
faithfully following legitimate legal constraints. A partisan unbiased 
redistricting plan may not exist, or may violate any number of other 
criteria. 
A second, and fundamental substantive limitation to these methods 
is that neither the courts nor social scientists have reached consensus 
on what outcome criteria should be applied. 85 As it turns out, it is 
provably impossible to create districts that optimize all candidate 
outcome criteria simultaneously, thus trade-offs among potential 
“good” outcomes are inevitable. And no one redistricting plan is 
likely to score highest on all the criteria that may be agreed upon to 
be desirable, even assuming a local consensus exists. How one values, 
for example, preserving communities versus having competitive 
districts is a trade-off that requires human judgment. There is no 
common dimension to these criteria, and the courts have been 
reluctant to issue guidance on such trade-offs in all but the most 
egregious violations. 
Information technology does offer some hope. The development of 
a new generation of software, such as our DistrictBuilder system,86 
has enabled members of the public to create hundreds of real 
redistricting plans—plans based on official census data, and satisfying 
all of the criteria required by law. The existence of this large corpus 
of plans for the first time is beginning to enable an empirical analysis 
of redistricting plans that both expands our understanding of the range 
of redistricting outcomes that are feasible in practice, and illuminates 
the trade-offs that members of the public tend to view as most 
desirable.  
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 See generally Altman & McDonald, supra note 76, at 77–88 (discussing the use of 
computing in evaluating and automating redistricting plans).  
85
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134
1198 CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62:4 
C. Information Technology and Institution-Selecting Regulation of 
Redistricting 
Technology has fundamentally changed the process of 
redistricting. Starting in the 1990s, geographic information systems 
were developed to aid those drawing redistricting plans. 
Computerized redistricting was an enormous leap forward in 
productivity from drawing districts on paper maps.87 Still, these early 
computer systems were prohibitively expensive for all but the best-
funded organizations to develop and implement.  
By the 2000 round of redistricting, computers had greatly 
increased in speed, decreased in cost, and become a ubiquitous part of 
redistricting. Simultaneously, the rapid expansion of the Internet and 
World Wide Web enabled redistricting authorities to disseminate 
information about redistricting widely and cheaply—if they were 
inclined to do so. Writing in 2005, we noted: 
Advances in technology seemed to offer the potential for 
deeper change, in a number of ways that have not been 
widely discussed: First, computing technology has the 
potential to change how politicians deliberate over proposed 
districts, since changes to district maps that would have taken 
days to make in the 1980’s and even 1990’s can now be made 
in minutes or hours, and because software now allows plans 
to be quickly presented and accurately compared. (One 
software developer we interviewed even drew particular 
attention to the popularity of the feature that allowed two 
plans to be compared to determine exactly where they 
differed.) Second, computing technology has opened the door 
to electronic submissions of maps drawn by the public and by 
interest groups, since redistricting software is now both 
relatively inexpensive and easy to use. Third, computing 
technology enables the use of richer data sources in a shorter 
period of time. In the past, because of the time-constraints 
under which redistricting takes place, and the difficulty of 
managing the computing and data, data-sources reflecting 
communities of interest were much more difficult to 
incorporate. 
                                                                                                                 
87
 See Micah Altman, Karin Mac Donald & Michael McDonald, Pushbutton 
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At the same time—there is no evidence that this potential has 
been realized to any great extent: Ease of deliberation is 
important only when political actors choose to deliberate. 
Public submission of plans makes a difference only when 
they are likely to be considered by a redistricting authority. A 
criterion such as “communities of interest” can only be 
applied when the appropriate data is collected and made 
available. These are, fundamentally, political issues, and we 
have not been able to uncover evidence that computing 
technology has, as yet, significantly altered them.88  
By the 2010 round of redistricting, redistricting software was low 
cost, computing power increased tremendously, and the data were 
generally readily available such that: 
Mappers were able to specify a desired outcome or 
outcomes—the number of people in a district, say, or the 
percentage of Democrats in it—and have the program design 
a potential new district instantly. These systems allow 
redistricters to create hundreds of rough drafts easily and 
quickly, and to choose from among them maps that are both 
politically and aesthetically appealing.89 
Moreover, in contrast to the previous round of redistricting, we are 
now seeing indications that technology is leading to an increase in the 
transparency of redistricting, and to an increase in public participation 
in redistricting.90 First, state legislative authorities are making 
proposed redistricting plans available online in the vast majority of 
states—a substantial increase relative to ten years ago. Second, 
substantially more of the electoral data needed for redistricting is 
available in this round of redistricting, due in large part to the efforts 
of individual academics and foundations acting in the public interest 
to collect, aggregate, clean, and disseminate public-use data. Third, 
online redistricting sites have enabled members of the public to create 
hundreds of legal plans—an increase of two orders of magnitude. 
The desirability of increased transparency and participation is 
being recognized at the highest levels of government.91 
                                                                                                                 
88
 Micah Altman & Michael McDonald, From Crayons to Computers: The Evolution of 
Computer Use in Redistricting, 23 SOC. SCI. COMPUTER REV. 334, 343 (2005), available at 
http://ssc.sagepub.com/content/23/3/334.full.pdf+html. 
89
 Don Peck & Caitlin Casey, The Nation in Numbers: Packing, Cracking, and 
Kidnapping: The Science of Gerrymandering, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Jan./Feb. 2004, at 50, 50–
51. 
90
 Altman & McDonald, supra note 34, at 247–48.   
91
 See Memorandum on Transparency and Open Government, 74 Fed. Reg. 4685, 4685 
135
1200 CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62:4 
Correspondingly, an emerging institutional principle for redistricting 
is the availability of data and open software to enable the public 
creation and evaluation of redistricting plans.   
In essence, open online redistricting is an institution-selecting 
mechanism. In its strongest form, open public redistricting online has 
the potential to shift the actors directly responsible for redistricting 
from a small number of legislators or commissioners to a much larger 
public.  
In a weaker form, where a smaller group is ultimately responsible 
for the selection of a redistricting plan, as will be the case in many 
places for the foreseeable future, open public redistricting may 
constrain redistricting. Public redistricting creates a corpus of 
evidence that is both broader and more detailed than what has been 
previously generated through independent commissions, and this 
evidence reveals geographical communities, public preferences over 
redistricting, and the range of possible redistricting outcomes 
achievable. When this evidence is a matter of public record, 
commissioners may be more constrained in their action; and the 
courts more willing to infer partisan intent where the resulting plan 
deviates substantially from public input.  
Specific principles for open access to government information are 
also becoming widely recognized. In October 2007, thirty open-
government advocates met in Sebastopol, California to discuss how 
government could make data open to the public in a systematic and 
principled way. The conference, led by Carl Malamud and Tim 
O’Reilly, and funded by a grant from the Sunlight Foundation, 
resulted in a list of eight principles, which were later expanded and 
updated by the foundation, to form their current “Ten Principles for 
Opening Up Government Information”: completeness, primacy, 
timeliness, ease of physical and electronic access, machine 
readability, nondiscrimination, use of commonly owned standards, 
public domain licensing, permanence, and elimination of usage 
costs.92 
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In 2010, with the support of the Sloan foundation, the Brookings 
Institution, and the American Enterprise institute, we convened an 
advisory board to develop guiding principles for transparency in 
redistricting. The advisory board members included key redistricting 
experts at Common Cause and the League of Women Voters, 
experienced redistricting consultants, and bipartisan representation 
from elected officials. Thomas Mann at the Brookings Institution and 
Normal Ornstein at the American Enterprise Institute directed the 
advisory board. The board issued principles for transparency and 
public participation in redistricting. These principles are in the same 
spirit as the Sunlight principles and require free electronic access to 
the complete information necessary for the public to “verify, 
reproduce and evaluate” all proposed redistricting plans. The AEI-
Brookings principles also recognize that the redistricting process is so 
complex that software is a practical necessity—transparency in 
redistricting also requires that software be made available to 
reproduce and evaluate redistricting plans proposed by the legislature. 
And this software should itself be transparent—preferably through 
use of open source, or if necessary, through documentation sufficient 
for complete independent replication of the results.93 
While barriers to public participation and transparency in 
redistricting have been lowered, challenges remain, particularly with 
respect to how redistricting authorities make available the election, 
geographic, and population data necessary to create legal redistricting 
plans, and the format in which they release their redistricting plans.94  
Nearly all states participate in what is known as Phase 2 of the 
Census Bureau’s redistricting data program in which states and 
localities transmit their political boundaries, including precincts and 
wards, to the Census Bureau, for inclusion in the geography that the 
Census Bureau uses in reporting population summaries.95 Electronic 
representations of election boundaries described in terms of census 
geography enable one to merge together census data and election 
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results, so that the electoral consequences of a redistricting plan can 
be predicted.  
There are two challenges to the integration of election data with 
census data. First, some states—such as Oregon and Rhode Island— 
do not transmit election boundaries to the Census Bureau, but rather 
they must be collected from election officials and expressed in the 
census geography. Some states and localities change their election 
boundaries at each election, requiring those who wish to evaluate a 
wide range of elections to collect and reconcile these boundaries. 
While some states collect, process, and publicly release these data, in 
other states consultants to the political parties collect this information 
and keep it private. A state that wishes to promote redistricting 
transparency and public participation should participate fully in Phase 
2 of the Census Bureau data collection effort and make publicly 
available changes to election boundaries.  
Second, some states do not report complete election data for their 
precincts. For example, Georgia and South Carolina report precinct-
level election-results only for persons who voted in-person on 
Election Day. Persons who voted early are reported in separate 
county-wide precincts. Predictions of election outcomes may be 
misleading if persons who voted in-person differ from those who 
voted early and there is a substantial number of early voters. Other 
states faced with a similar problem chose to report non-precinct 
election results by voters’ home precinct,96 which is the best method 
of addressing this issue. 
A redistricting authority can reduce public participation and 
transparency in the redistricting process by limiting access to the 
geographic boundaries that are required by law to be used in 
redistricting. For example, Ohio did not transmit the correct 
boundaries of their precincts, wards, and local governments to the 
Census Bureau, which was a rather serious issue since the Ohio 
constitution requires state legislative districts to respect local 
government and election boundaries.97 The state commissioned a 
consultant to digitize the correct boundaries for the state legislative 
redistricting. The authors supported an Ohio coalition of redistricting 
advocacy groups and found that the multiple releases of the 
consultant’s database issued to fix problems (some of which we had 
originally identified) caused costly rework and technical challenges, 
thereby impeding the advocates’ ability to fully participate in the 
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redistricting process. This situation would not have occurred if Ohio 
had worked fully with the Census Bureau to define its geography. 
A redistricting authority can reduce public participation and 
transparency by limiting access to correct population data. For 
example, leading into the 2010 redistricting New York passed a law 
that called for the reallocation of prisoners to their residence of origin 
for the purposes of state legislative redistricting.98 The state 
legislature’s Legislative Task Force, the entity responsible for 
constructing these data, delayed nearly a year. The prison-adjusted 
population data was released the same week the Legislative Task 
Force released their draft redistricting plans, which made it difficult 
for advocates to evaluate the plans and to propose their own as 
alternatives. This situation illustrates the importance of the timely 
release of data. 
A redistricting authority can reduce public participation and 
transparency by releasing data in forms that are difficult to use. 
Redistricting software commonly describes redistricting plans in a 
format known as the block equivalency file. In this format each 
census block—the lowest level of census geography—is assigned to a 
corresponding district. All redistricting authorities, all of which use 
commercial redistricting software, are capable of releasing plans in 
this common format, but not all do. Some states simply provide 
images of proposed plans—which may not even provide enough 
detail to distinguish boundaries unambiguously; some provide what 
are known as “metes and bounds,” which literally describe the 
boundaries of districts in terms of roads, cities, rivers, and other 
features; and some report plan components, which is a hierarchical 
listing of census geography from counties down that are wholly 
contained in each district. All three of these alternative methods of 
disseminating plans are not easily imported into redistricting 
software, thereby posing a challenge to independent evaluation of 
proposed plans. Some states have made advances towards greater 
transparency, and we urge more to do so. New York, a state that 
traditionally has released plans in metes and bounds, released block 
equivalency files this cycle. 
CONCLUSION 
New technologies hold great promise for increasing transparency 
and public participation in the redistricting process. These 
technologies are enabling the public to view redistricting plans as 
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they are proposed, evaluate them for compliance with traditional 
redistricting principles and political effects, and even propose their 
own alternatives:99 These uses of technology highlight an emerging 
set of institutional principles to promote public participation and 
transparency in redistricting for the twenty-first century: First, 
redistricting authorities may disseminate information on the Internet, 
such as proposed maps, meeting transcripts, and reports of district. 
This reduces barriers to monitoring the redistricting process. Second, 
they may make data available describing proposed districts in ways 
that enable independent evaluation. This facilitates forecasting of 
redistricting outcomes. Third, they may make software available to 
enable the public to propose their own plans. This puts pressure on 
the institutions of redistricting to be accountable. Finally, with 
lowered barriers of entry for those interested in drawing districts, 
redistricting authorities may accept plans and comments from the 
public. And this would shift the institutions of redistricting toward 
greater independence from political forces.  
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